Too much capital limits outsized returns
“Berkshire’s capital base is now simply too large to allow us to earn truly outsized returns.”
Business
“Berkshire’s capital base is now simply too large to allow us to earn truly outsized returns.”
“Writing checks to the IRS that include strings of zeros does not bother Charlie or me. Berkshire as a corporation, and we as individuals, have prospered in America as we would have in no other country.”
“Our calculus i s different: We simply measure whether we are creating more than a dollar of value per dollar spent — and if tha t calculation is favorable, the more dollars we spend the happier I am.”
“At Berkshire we feel that telling outstanding CEOs, such as Tony, how to run their companies would be the height of foolishness.”
“We want our managers to think about what counts, not how it will be counted.”
“Indeed, a majority of our shares are held by investors who expect to die still holding them. We can therefore ask our CEOs t o manage for maximum long-term value, rather than for next quarter’s earnings.”
“We certainly don’t ignore the current results of our businesses — in most cases, they are of great importance — but we never want them to be achieved at the expense of our building ever-greater competitive strengths.”
“Wide swings in earnings hurt both credit ratings and p/e ratios, even when the business that produces such swings has an expectancy of satisfactory profits over time.”
“A caution is appropriate here: Because loss costs must be estimated, insurers have enormous latitude in figuring their underwriting results, and that makes it very difficult for investors to calculate a company's true cost of float.”
“If [the cost of float] becomes too high, growth in float becomes a curse rather than a blessing.”
“As long as we can continue to achieve an underwriting profit, float will continue to outrank net worth in value.”
“We have one excuse, though: In allocating capital, activity does not correlate with achievement. Indeed, in the fields of investments and acquisitions, frenetic behavior is often counterproductive.”
“Cash never makes us happy. But it’s better to have the money burning a hole in Berkshire’ s pocket than r esting comfortably in someone else’s.”
“Our never -comment-even-if-untrue policy in regard to investments may disappoint ‘piggybackers’ but wil l benefit owners: Your Berkshire shares would be worth less if we discussed what we are doing.”
“In effect, accounting principles offer management a choice: Pay employees in one form and count the cost, or p ay them in another form and ignore the cost. Small wonder then that the use of options has mushroomed.”
“Once such a n everybody’s-doing-it attitude takes hold, ethical misgivings vanish. Call this behavior Son of Gresham: Ba d accounting drives out good.”
“The distortion du jour is the ‘restructuring charge,’ an accounting entry that can, of course, be legitimate but that too often is a device for manipulating earnings.”
“In the acq uisition arena, restructuring has been raised to an art form: Managements now frequently us e mergers to dishonestly rearrange the value of assets and liabilities in ways that will allow them to both smooth and swell future earnings.”
“Indeed, at deal time, major auditing firms sometimes point out the possibilities for a little accounting magic (or for a lot). Getting this push from the pulpit, first-class people will frequently stoop to third-class tactics.”
“Berkshire has kept entirely clear of [this loss reserves boost]: If we are to disappoint you, we would rather it be with our earnings than with our accounting.”
“Though auditor s should regard the investing public as their client, they tend to kowtow instead to the managers who choose them and dole out their pay. (‘Whose bread I eat, his song I sing.’)”
“At Berkshire, we regard the holder of one share of B stock as the equal of our large institutional investors.”