4 ideas
Engineer Aomine is sent to judge whether the job can be done. He treats it as an ordinary bid: site survey, materials sourcing, launch logistics, schedule, and cost. The project advances or stalls on contracts, supply chains, and budget overruns rather than on heroics. The lunar south pole is chosen for its near-continuous sunlight and access to water ice.
Where every kilogram must be launched from Earth, transport cost per kilogram outweighs every other design variable. Good engineering therefore means minimizing imported mass and making structure, radiation shielding, water, and propellant from local regolith and ice. A site is chosen for what it can supply locally, not for its scenery.
A seemingly impossible project becomes tractable once it is broken into discrete contracts: surveys, landers, power, habitat modules, and transport. Each contract has a price, a supplier, and someone who pays for it. A project is feasible when every link can be procured and financed, not when the whole vision is technically possible. Procurement and financing decisions shape the final design as much as physics does.
A private venture with a paying product, here a luxury hotel, can build infrastructure that state science programs cannot justify. Examples include power plants, ice extraction, landing sites, and transport routes. Once in place, that infrastructure lowers the cost of every later scientific or settlement activity. The revenue model, not the exploration motive, determines what gets built first.