6 ideas
Good and bad exist only in sensation, and death is the end of sensation, so death cannot be bad for the one who dies. Where death is, we are not; where we are, death is not. Fearing death therefore means suffering now over a condition we will never experience, which makes the fear itself the only real harm.
Desires fall into three classes: natural and necessary (food, shelter, freedom from bodily pain, what happiness depends on), natural but unnecessary (luxurious variations like rich food), and empty or vain (wealth, fame, power without limit). The first class is easy to satisfy and has a natural limit. The last class has no limit and so can never be fulfilled, so a pleasant life comes from cutting it out rather than chasing it.
The pleasure that is the goal of life is not sensual indulgence but freedom from pain in the body (aponia) and freedom from turmoil in the soul (ataraxia). On this view the highest good is a stable resting state rather than an escalating series of thrills.
Pleasure is the standard for every choice, yet not every pleasure should be chosen and not every pain avoided. You weigh consequences: some pleasures bring greater pains later and should be declined, while some pains are worth enduring because they produce greater pleasure. The decision rule is long-run net freedom from disturbance, not what feels good now.
Getting used to plain food and modest means secures health, makes a person ready for life's necessities, and makes occasional luxury more enjoyable. Someone who needs little cannot be made miserable when fortune takes things away. Self-sufficiency is valuable because it removes dependence on circumstances outside your control, not because austerity is good in itself.
Practical wisdom, meaning sober reasoning that looks into the causes of every choice and drives out beliefs that disturb the soul, is worth more than philosophy itself. It produces all the other virtues, because a pleasant life is impossible without living wisely, honorably and justly, and a virtuous life is impossible without pleasure. Virtue and pleasure therefore depend on each other rather than compete.