5 ideas
After the 1956 Suez Crisis exposed that Britain could no longer act as a great power, its elite rebuilt national relevance around serving wealthy foreigners rather than ruling territory. The City of London, the offshore territories and the legal profession took on a butler's role: discreet, polished, deferential to whoever pays, and uninterested in where the money came from.
Bullough traces the Eurodollar market to Midland Bank taking in Soviet-held dollars in 1955, before Suez, and describes London banks then trading dollars held outside America. The Bank of England chose not to supervise this business, so it grew in a space left unregulated by British indulgence. In his account this was an early model for offshore finance.
Places like the British Virgin Islands, Cayman and Gibraltar are British enough to borrow the credibility of English law and the Privy Council. They are also autonomous enough that London can disclaim responsibility when they sell secrecy. This split sovereignty lets Britain profit from tax-haven business while insisting it has no power to stop it.
A century-old Scottish vehicle meant for farmers and family investors had legal personality but did not have to disclose its real owners or file accounts. Once formation agents noticed, tens of thousands were registered at shared addresses and used to route billions out of the former Soviet Union, including through the Moldovan bank fraud and the Russian Laundromat.
English libel law puts the burden of proof on defendants, is very expensive to fight, and lets foreigners sue in London. Wealthy figures use it to threaten journalists and publishers so that critical reporting is never written. Britain sells silence as well as money-hiding, so the absence of scrutiny can be a purchased service rather than a sign of innocence.