3 ideas
The functions usually used to argue for a self, such as unifying experience, having a point of view, and directing action, are all performed by attention. Once attention is recognized as the mind's organizing activity, positing an additional owner or controller behind it explains nothing further. Denying the self is therefore not denying subjectivity; it relocates subjectivity into how attention structures experience.
Buddhaghosa analyzes a single perception as a fixed series of momentary mental events. A background life-continuum is interrupted by an orienting act (adverting), then followed by sensing, receiving, investigating, determining, a phase of active response (impulsion), and finally registration. Attention appears at the start as the switch that pulls the mind out of its idle stream toward an object, so perception is an ordered process rather than an act by a perceiver.
Ganeri reads Buddhaghosa as treating attention as having two components: placing, which he identifies with one-pointedness (ekaggatā), and focusing, which he identifies with manasikāra. On his account both are required in every experiential episode.